That’s the part of me that wishes, the part that romanticizes the past, the part that will recreate scenes from a romantic movie with you, the part of me that dreams, the part that sometimes goes against all logic and believes in the impossible, the part that will always believe in mad love.

I knew in these moments that grieving the loss of our daughter would be soul-crushing, but I had to make it home to our three babies and my husband. I had to. Part of me will always wonder if it was truly me or if someone else was in the picture, was she an ex or a new fling? Was she my replacement or was I hers? Could she have loved you the way I wanted to? This may overstate my epistemic position with respect to (NA24). In any case, in accepting Falsism, I ought to accept that (NA24) is false. If I believe outright that (NA24) is false, it also seems that I ought not wonder whether (NA24) is true or false. This follows from the attractive idea that to believe a proposition outright is to treat it as if one knows it (Williamson, 2000, 46–47). If I were to instead assign a high credence to Falsism, say .80, this seems compatible with wondering whether (NA24) is true or false, however it leads to other difficulties. In assigning a credence of .80 to Falsism, I should assign (at least) a credence of .80 to the proposition that (NA24) is false, and, assuming, as we are, that the evil scientist’s promise is sincere, I should assign a credence of (at least) .80 to the proposition that I will go on holiday. The more confident I become of Falsism, the more confident I should be that I will go on holiday and avoid torture! I put aside the interesting question of what implications partial belief in Falsism and other theories of future contingents have for wondering about the future. Thank you to Uri Liebowitz and an anonymous referee for pressing this point. Our beautiful family of five, built by adoption and biology, full of life, deep love, disability, trauma, and joy. We were thrilled to be welcoming a fourth child, but this second pregnancy was overwhelmingly challenging from the beginning. As time went on instead of improving, I started to drastically decline in physical health. RELATED: Sometimes Pregnancy is DarkMacFarlane, J. (2014). Assessment sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications. Oxford University Press. On August 24, I was 16 weeks pregnant with our daughter Maya. Our lives were changed forever that day when we had to face the most unimaginable decision . . . death or death.

Several people would tell me stories of their own losses. People that I had never really had an in-depth conversation with before shared their personal heartaches. One woman told me she had lost two children over twenty years ago and she still thinks of them. “You never forget,” she said. I now know how true that statement is. These people helped me to heal. I’m so thankful they took the time to share their stories with me. I didn’t feel alone anymore. I wasn’t a freak of nature. Bad things really do happen to good people. This happens. Women just don’t talk about it very often. But it happens. Field, H. (2015). Mathematical undecidables, metaphysical realism, and equivalent descriptions. In R. E. Auxier, D. R. Anderson, & L. E. Hahn (Eds.), The philosophy of Hilary Putnam (pp. 145–172). Open Court. We can distinguish between true and false answers to a question. Both a and b are true answers to A, and c is a false answer to A. Furthermore, a is a true partial answer to A, whereas b is a true complete answer to A: b completely and truly answers A: it states that Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins and Buzz Aldrin flew in the Apollo 11 mission and no one else did. True, complete answers are the logically strongest true answers entailing all partial answers.Note how we would model Susan’s initial wondering whether Larry is bald. It involves wondering which of the possible, complete answers: ‘Larry is bald’ is true, ‘Larry is bald’ is middle, ‘Larry is bald’ is false is the correct answer to L. And once Susan learns that ‘Larry is bald’ is middle, her inquiry comes to an end. But this model cannot be applied in the case of wondering about future contingents since, once one accepts Middlism for future contingents, (NA24) is true and (NA24) is false are ruled out as possible answers to N. Just as coming to know that ‘Larry is bald’ is middle makes it inappropriate for Susan to continue to wonder whether L, coming to know that (NA24) is middle seems to make it inappropriate to continue to wonder whether N. Of course it is open to the Middlist to claim that wondering about future contingents is wholly different than wondering about vague propositions, but considering the case of vagueness suggests that wondering whether in cases of indeterminacy is plausibly understood as wondering what truth-value a given proposition has, and learning the truth-value renders further wondering inappropriate. The Middlist who insists that wondering about future contingents is appropriate would need to give this up: knowing what truth-value a proposition, p, has is compatible with wondering whether p. It is worth noting the oddity in accepting this. For a Middlist to wonder whether it will rain tomorrow is not for her to wonder whether it is true that it will rain tomorrow. She knows that it is not true that it will rain tomorrow, yet she wonders whether it will rain. Footnote 33 An utterance of ‘I know that it is not true that it will rain tomorrow and I wonder whether it will’ certainly sounds defective, but should be assertable if knowing what truth-value a future contingent has is compatible with wondering about it. Furthermore, Middlists shouldn’t hesitate to accept a bet that it is not true that it will rain tomorrow (and shouldn’t hesitate to accept a bet that it is not false that it will). One might have thought that introducing an intermediate truth-value provides a way of modelling our ignorance of future contingents, but once we recognize that ignorance and wondering are plausibly understood as ignorance and wondering about what truth-value a proposition has, we realise that introducing an intermediate truth-value undermines, rather than vindicates, our wondering about future contingents. 4.3 Supervaluationism I can assume without contradiction that my presence in Warsaw at a certain moment of next year, e.g. at noon on 21 December, is at the present time determined neither positively or negatively. Hence it is possible, but not necessary, that I shall be present in Warsaw at the given time. On this assumption the proposition I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of next year can at the present time be neither true nor false. For if it were true now, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary, which is contradictory to the assumption. If it were false now, on the other hand, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be impossible, which is also contradictory to the assumption. Therefore the proposition considered is at the moment neither true nor false ... (Łukasiewicz 1930, 53).

Necessarily, if one knows at t that Q is unsound, then one ought not wonder whether Q at t. Footnote 28 I smiled and said, "Well sure that's just life isn't it".Leaving the hospital I felt so numb, so cold, so lonely. My husband put his arm around me, I wrapped my arms tightly around my abdomen. I felt so empty, so hollow.Miscarriage isstill not talked about much. I can't help but think that part of the reason for this is because women feel they are not allowed or meant to be upset about it. " What exactly are questions? There is no general agreement on the metaphysics of questions and fortunately, exactly what questions are need not concern us. I will follow Friedman in assuming that questions are not propositions (Friedman, 2013, 150). Some take questions to be sets of propositions, where the set of propositions consists of all the possible answers to the question. Others take questions to be open propositions. Footnote 16 I'm stretching out of reach, but you're just out too far. I've got my arms wide open, waiting for that hug you promised me before you'd leave. I'm still waiting for Friday to happen, the day you were supposed to see me before you moved. I'll always be waiting for more memories to make.

Necessarily, if one knows Q(a) at t, then one ought not have an interrogative attitude towards Q at t (Friedman, 2017, 311). One might respond “But isn’t there an asymmetry between the past and the future? Isn’t the past fixed and the future open? So, shouldn’t there be an asymmetry in wondering about the future versus wondering about the past?” I agree that there are various asymmetries between the past and the future, and some underlie an asymmetry in mental attitudes, but it is not clear that there is such an asymmetry in our wondering whether attitudes. Relief, regret, anticipation, and fear are all plausibly temporally asymmetric attitudes. For example, if Susan regrets not sending Mia a card for her birthday, and then learns that Mia’s birthday is not until next month, it is inappropriate for her to continue to regret not sending Mia a card for her birthday (even if Susan knows she is bad about sending cards and knows she will not send her one next month). But wondering whether doesn’t seem to be temporally asymmetric in this way. The following three considerations support the conclusion that wondering whether attitudes about future events are much like wondering whether attitudes about past and present events. The first is that in the case of temporally asymmetric attitudes like relief and anticipation, learning how we are temporally related to the event in question has a significant impact on the attitude. This does not seem to be the case for wondering whether. We can wonder whether a particular event occurs without knowing (or caring) whether the event is in our future. Discovering that the event lies in our future does not appear to affect our wondering whether attitude in the way that it does with other temporally asymmetric attitudes like relief and anticipation. Suppose Wanda wonders whether Serena Williams wins the 2021 US Open. Due to her preoccupation with other things and the disarray of the tournament calendar due to Covid, Wanda is unaware of whether the 2021 US Open has already taken place. Finding out that the 2021 US Open hasn’t happened yet does not alter her attitude of wondering whether Serena Williams wins. It would be entirely appropriate for her to continue to wonder whether Serena Williams wins were she to discover that the 2021 US Open hasn’t happened yet. In contrast, it would have a significant impact on her attitude of anticipation of the event: learning that it hasn’t happened yet may lead her to adopt an attitude of anticipation towards the event. In this section I consider the psychological attitude of wondering whether, for example, wondering whether John Glenn flew in the Apollo 11 mission, wondering whether it is currently raining in Glasgow, or wondering whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow. Footnote 15 I draw heavily on Jane Friedman’s recent work on interrogative attitudes. I also outline some norms for wondering whether that follow on from her account.

It may seem that if at moment m it is sensible to wonder whether A, then it must be that either A is settled true at m, or that A is settled false at m. More generally, it may seem that if one is to be able, at m, properly to raise the question whether A, then A must be either settled true or settled false...No matter how things eventuate, the question posed on Monday, “Will there be a sea battle tomorrow?” will be answered. If there is a sea battle on Tuesday, then we may say, “The answer to the question is definitely ‘yes’.”; while if on Tuesday there is no sea battle, then we may say, “The answer to the question is definitely ‘no’.” We should therefore not reject the Monday question as badly posed. It is perfectly correct on Monday to say something like “We cannot yet provide a settled answer to that question, but must wait and see” (Belnap et al., 2001, 176). It’s always easier to miss someone in the middle of the night when you’re lonely than it is to miss someone in the middle of the day when you’re busy. And I think that says a lot.