inflict a sanction. This could result in arbitrary biases e. Mukhtara Mai case and more recently the Karo rules of obligation with secondary rules. It is this very union that will take the society from being pre-

Benjamin C. Zipursky, “Legal Obligations and the Internal Aspect of Rules” (2006), 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1229 The Concept of Law is a nonfiction book by legal philosopher and Oxford University professor H. L. A. Hart. The central concept of the book is the examination of legal philosophy within the context of analytical jurisprudence. The other philosophical area that Hart explores is linguistic analysis, which is the definitions of specific legal terms and expressions, and their interpretation depending on context. In fact, linguistic analysis is a method that Hart employs in writing the book. This is because the theory and practice of law are dependent on the interpretation of legal terms, expressions, rulings, and opinions of judges. For this reason, Hart emphasizes the importance of defining terms and how they could be interpreted by lawyers and legal scholars. Chapter 5; Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules: Hart commences this chapter by giving a that deviation or non-conformity for rules is the REASON for applying the sanction and not the otherLaw can be analysed in terms of rules which is largely based on Hart’s theory of law. According to him, rules are concerned not with what happens but with what is to be done. Rules are imperative or prescriptive rather than indicative or descriptive. Rules have a certain independence or self-legitimating character. Rules are different from commands. Commands normally call for one unique performance whereas rules have a general application and demands repeated activity. In some cases rules are constitutive and define the activity in a question like rules of a game while in others they regulate activities which would take place in any case whether the rules existed or not like rules of grammar, of morals and of law.[6]Rules of game, club, and societies share the feature of rule of law in so far as these are of formal nature, are open to amendment by bodies authorized for this purpose, and some sort of adjudicating process is also found when there is any difficulty as to meaning or the application of these rules. As against these rules of morality or law are not amenable to legislative alteration and are not resolvable by adjudication.[7] Legal and moral rules both are invitum. Obedience to them is non-optional. Rules of game and club apply only within limited context, to players during the game. Law and morals are concerned with much broader aspects of life. Rules of games are not compulsory; withdrawal and resignation are permanent possibilities. In case of morals, there is no such choice and this is largely true of law also. Thus according to Hart, ‘Law consists of rules which are of broad application and non-optional character, but which are at the same time amenable to formalization, legislation and adjudication.’[8] Hart critiques the work of the noted lawyer and professor John Austin (1790-1859). In particular, Hart dissects Austin’s theory of “Command Law.” This concept posits that individuals follow laws only because there are consequences, i.e., there is some visible force near them that compels them to act in a particular way. People generally fear the law because they feel that it may be applied toward all of their actions. Hart calls this tendency “the internal view of law.” Hart feels that being obliged/ forced to something is a psychological state dependent upon external Hart's method combined the careful analysis of twentieth-century analytic philosophy with the jurisprudential tradition of Jeremy Bentham, the great English legal, political, and moral philosopher. Hart's conception of law had parallels to the Pure Theory of Law formulated by Austrian legal philosopher Hans Kelsen, though Hart rejected several distinctive features of Kelsen's theory.

identifying primary rules of obligation. The criteria may take any one or more of the variety of forms: such a society and it application to a larger sphere would be that the rules would possess UNCERTAINTY Hart draws a distinction between a social habit (which people follow habitually but where breaking the habit does not bring about opprobrium - going to the cinema on Thursday for example) and a social rule (where breaking the rule is seen as wrong - neglecting to take off one's hat upon entering a church, for example). We feel in some sense bound by social rules and laws frequently appear to be types of social rule.Postema, Gerald (2011). Enrico Pattaro (ed.). Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Common Law World. A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. Vol.11. Springer. p.261. This essay will be about HLA Hart’s concept of legal obligation. It will be divided into two sections, the first one explaining what legal obligation is for Hart and in which situation an individual is under a legal obligation. The second one will analyse whether the account of the legal obligation provided by Hart is adequate or not by analysing some criticism it faces. INEFFICIENCY by virtue of the fact that incase a dispute arises there will be no agency authorized to inclƵde an edžƉlanaƚion of ͚ǁhaƚ iƐ meanƚ bLJ ƌƵleƐ being geneƌallLJ acceƉƚed͕͛ ͚ƐƵƉƉoƌƚed bLJ cƌiƚiciƐm͕͛

uncertainty around nature of secondary rules. First identified by Hart as power conferring, but in hislegal to legal. [Three types of secondary rules; Rules of change, Rules of adjudication and the rule of There are no legal systems that can be classified as pareto optimal. The next best thing is to make sure that the system does not remain at a static quality but instead is dynamic and progressive. The remedy for the static quality of the regime of primary rules are rules of change. [20] Generally, rules of change confer and prohibit power of the creation, extinction and alteration of primary and secondary rules. Rules of change range in complexity: “the powers conferred may be unrestricted or limited in various ways: and the rules may, besides specifying the persons who are to legislate, define in more or less rigid terms the procedure to be followed in legislation.” As mentioned earlier, rules of change are interdependent with the other rules. Hart emphasizes the “close connection between the rules of change and the rules of recognition.” Where rules of change exist, rules of recognition "ʺwill necessarily incorporate a reference to legislation as an identifying feature of the rules, though it need not refer to all the details of procedure involved in legislation.” [21] Rules of adjudication [ edit ]

Primary rules regulate the behavior of man in the society. These rules either grant rights or impose obligations on the members of the society.[9] More than 50 years after it was first published, The Concept of Law remains the most important work of legal philosophy in the English-speaking world. In this volume, written for both students and specialists, 13 leading scholars look afresh at Hart's great book. Hart states that Dworkin criticism is too strong, it doesn’t only require an individual who accepts the rules as duty-imposing and reason-giving to believe that there are good moral grounds or justification for obeying rules, but that such grounds actually exist [19]. What would the grounds for morally wrong rules be that are accepted by a society? For example, in the past it was prohibited for people of certain colour to use public facilities [20]. Minorities were treated as slaves and gender equality was not accepted. What are the moral grounds or justifications for such rules? Hart does not deny that a conventional rule can also be believed in morally, however, this is not the reason that it imposes a legal obligation on a community. It is not possible to provide a justification for every single rule that imposes a legal obligation and an account that does such, would be inadequate.said to depend or come as a result of attitude, but attitude is explained by reference to criticism and its As per Hart: “Where there is law, the human direct no Joseph Raz has been teaching at Oxford University since 1972. He has been Professor of the Philosophy of Law there since 1985, and Research Professor since 2006; he has also been Professor at Columbia University since 2002. He is a Fellow of the British signs and NOT in the manner in which members of the group that adhere to the internal point of view,