Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars

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Each chapter begins with an account of the technology’s early development, including its first adoption by navies and initial expectations surrounding it. Next, the chapter discusses the discovery phase. For mines, torpedoes, and radio, this is the Russo-Japanese War; for submarines and aircraft, World War I; and for radar, World War II. Once the discovery phase is covered, the chapter focuses on evolution. In most cases this occurred after the war in which discovery took place, although submarines passed through both a discovery phase and an evolution phase during World War I, and radar did the same in World War II. After evolution, the exploitation of the fully developed technology is examined. For five of the technologies, the exploitation phase occurred in World War II; radio was sufficiently developed by 1914 to be exploited in both wars. Countermeasures and further evolution are discussed where relevant. The section describing the exploitation of the technology in World War II is followed by a summary of postwar developments and a brief review of the technology’s current state. Each chapter concludes with lessons to be learned. A point that O’Hara and Heinz make to explain this differential in development time is that there is an emotional current to developing technology. Mines, mine layers, and mine sweepers do not evoke the emotional attachment that flow to aircraft, ships of the line, and submarines with crews admired for their bravery and exploits. This emotional preference influences which technologies receive priority for development. Exciting technology garners the most attention and investment. This can create a blind spot for older technology that is used in a novel way. A technology might be boring but that does not mean it is ineffective. discuss how navies developed doctrine and incorporated ancillary technologies to improve the core technology’s effectiveness. the technology for the purposes of ‘securing power at sea.’” —Dr. John T. Kuehn, professor of Military History, US Army Command and General Staff College and author of America's First General Staff: A Short History of the Rise and Fall of the General Board of the U.S. Navy, 1900-1950 “ Innovating Victory is a valuable augmentation of our

We recognize that we are shouldering a vast subject but consider it worthwhile to collect and follow the threads of technological development over more than a century of time and the course of three major and several smaller wars. To the best of our knowledge, such a broad and structured look at naval technology as a process viewed through the lens of specific application has never been done. Our goal is to seek new perspectives and insights and identify the factors that accelerate or retard the process of technological development. To accomplish such an ambitious goal, this work strives to be a synthesis and a simplification without being simplistic. By 1914, with combat governed by caution, the capital ship’s strategic function had come to dominate its tactical function. Basically, because cost had escalated to the point where relatively few nations could afford to construct capital ships in any quantity, their primary function became to exist rather than to fight. Their very existence in superior numbers was enough to guarantee sea control. There was no point in fighting. This strategic aspect of the dreadnought revolution, as expressed in World War I, caught navies by surprise when it was recognized at all. Submarines and aircraft. These platforms allowed navies to operate in new environments below and above the surface of the sea, confounding existing weapons and tactics and expanding the scope of naval warfare. Clearly, synergy is involved, and all six of these technologies were deeply intertwined by 1945. Case studies will show how this synergy affected actual combat. The narrative will focus on the technologies of the first three waves. Fourth-wave technologies—that is, technologies invented or developed since the end of World War II—will be treated very lightly as they remain largely untested in peer-to-peer combat. It is not our intention to judge how such technologies might fare in a future war; instead, the purpose of this book is to consider basic principles. Given the limitations of the cases presented here, the authors did a commendable job of creating an accessible and readable volume that points out some potential pitfalls to avoid and techniques for developing technological advantage in wartime. The target audience is not the Department of Defense Acquisition Professional or the cadre of doctrine writers who will not be surprised by any of the book’s findings. Military enthusiasts, whether professional or amateur, however, will enjoy the book and should add it to their military history library.O’Hara and Heinz studied the development of weapons (mines and torpedoes), tools (radio and radar), and platforms (submarines and aircraft). The guiding idea was to focus, not on technical details but to explore “the process by which each technology’s possibilities were first recognized, tested, then used, or not used, to best advantage” (2). Aside from the specific technologies, the book also considers the effects of human factors such as prior established practice, politics, and policy. The goal was to divine any principles that governed the process and determine whether those principles applied across platforms, technologies, and nations. The authors also wanted to know whether any identified principles led to victory irrespective of the time in history or the specific technology pursued. This would help answer the question of whether those principles were generalizable enough to apply developing technology today. Innovating Victory – Naval Technology in Three Wars. By Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard R. Heinz. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2022.

This book relates the development and use of six important and successful technologies, but to focus on success might give the false impression that every invention has a use, or that every use has a lasting purpose, or even that technologies with the strongest pedigrees and the most clearly defined uses will continued to be relevant. For navies, the ultimate criterion is whether the weapon/tool/platform effectively advances the task of securing power at sea and contributes to ultimate victory. Technology was hardly the only force that shaped naval warfare in the twentieth century, but it was a force that navies always had to take into account. It affected naval warfare from the most tactical level to the grandest national strategies. This study, then, looks at how six technologies facilitated and frustrated navies in their pursuit of victory. The book is organized into eight chapters. The lead chapter, “Use, Doctrine, Innovation” provides an overview of the previously mentioned human factors. This is followed by six chapters exploring the historical development of mines, torpedoes, radio, radar, submarines, and aircraft. The closing chapter, “Conclusions,” lays out what the authors discovered as principles. Based on the scope of the bibliography and the well-documented endnotes, it is apparent that the chapters are thoroughly researched. The bibliography is well-organized, showing that the authors made liberal use of official histories and primary documents and hundreds of articles, chapters, and books by well-respected scholars. Moreover, the chapters are provided with useful illustrations, pictures, and graphics that emphasize the authors’ points. Vipul Amin, a Managing Director at The Carlyle Group, said, “As more and more businesses grasp the need to not just clean surfaces, but disinfect them, we see tremendous growth opportunity for Victory. Their highly effective technologies are more cost effective, use less disinfectant and operate faster than alternative disinfecting methods. We look forward to working alongside the co-founders and the entire Victory team as we support their continued expansion.”

Overall, the book provides useful insights from its analysis and discussion of key tecnological developments during the first half of the 20th century. It also provides some stimulus for consideration by those planning the future of navies, in an inceasingly complex and challenging world. One of the key messages from the book is the need for a combination of scientists and specialists to work in collaboration with the end users to ensure a successful and effective outcome. There is one important caveat here. A paradox can exist with technologies that help us do more with less: they can increase consumption of the very resources one is trying to conserve. By an effect known as Jevons Paradox, they can increase greenhouse emissions. For example, a technology that reduces demand for fossil fuels will apply a downward pressure – at least in the short term – to the fuel’s price; this incentivises other players to buy the fuel – and use it inefficiently. For this reason, technological solutions to global warming will need to be coupled with international laws and taxation schemes that ensure that fossil fuels and trees stay in the ground. The value of technological solutions arguably lies in making the transition to a low carbon economy politically feasible. New technologies bring new vulnerabilities. Radar and Active sonar emit sound waves that can detect and be detected by the enemy. Computer based systems whilst bringing efficiencies in operations, also expose users to increasing levels of vulnerability. New technologies do not materialize fully functional as from Aladdin’s lamp. History shows that a successful technology undergoes a process: invention, development, acceptance, deployment, and then a cycle of discovery, evolution, and exploitation. The capstone of this process is determining the technology’s best uses and then combining those with best practices for best results. In every case, the goal is a combat advantage. In 1904, 1914, and 1939, navies went to war with unproven technologies and experienced steep learning curves in trying to match expectations with practical and effective use. Should war break out tomorrow, the learning curve will be even steeper.

The dreadnought battleship provides an example of how combat experience can confound expectations. The dreadnought battleship was, in 1914, the alpha naval technology upon which victory at sea was supposed to depend. In the event, the technology produced results far different than those envisioned by politicians, admiralties, and the public: dominance without decisive victory for the British, and the seedbeds of revolution for the Russians, Germans, and Austro-Hungarians. Within forty years of its 1906 introduction, the dreadnought battleship had been supplanted. The last few heavily modified examples of the type are thirty years out of service while submarines and aircraft carriers dominate the seas of the twenty-first century. Why was the dreadnought superseded? Because it no longer had a use that justified its cost.

Animals fight with horns, teeth, and claws. Humans can bite and scratch as well, but to win, they use technology. The word technology is a compound of two Greek roots, tekhne (craft) and logia (learning). In essence, technology is the practical application of knowledge expressed through the use of a device. The twentieth century was a time of profound technological change. In naval terms, this change came in four major waves, with the first three climaxed by a major naval war. The first wave started in the mid-nineteenth century as coal-fired steam engines replaced sail, armor was developed, guns and mines were improved, torpedoes appeared, and radio was introduced. This wave peaked in the Russo-Japanese War. In the second wave, which started in 1905 and ran through World War I, naval warfare became three-dimensional with the development of practical submarines and aircraft. The armored gunnery platform reached its acme of power and influence and imperceptibly began to fade in importance. The third wave, which lasted through the end of World War II, moved naval warfare fully into the electromagnetic spectrum as technologies such as radar and sonar expanded perceptions beyond the horizon and beneath the waves, revolutionized the collection and use of information, and saw the introduction of practical guided weapons. The fourth wave is under way. Naval warfare has entered another dimension—starting with the splitting of the atom and progressing to satellites, computers, drones, data networks, artificial intelligence, and a new generation of weapons using magnetic and directed energy. The fourth wave has lasted the longest, not because the pace of invention has slowed—it has in fact accelerated—but because since 1945 there has been no major peer-to-peer naval war—that is, a total war between opponents with similar technological resources—to prove these new technologies in all-out combat. Vincent P. O’Hara is an independent naval historian and the author of thirteen works, including Six Victories: North Africa, Malta, and the Mediterranean Convoy War, November 1941-March 1942 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019) and with Leonard R. Heinz, Clash of Fleets: Naval Battles of the Great War, 1914-18 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017). He holds a history degree from the University of California, Berkeley. Leonard R. Heinz worked for many years as a financial services lawyer while maintaining an active interest in military and naval history. He has written articles and designed wargames on naval topics and earned a history degree from the University of Pennsylvania. Victory Innovations is a leading provider of cordless electrostatic spraying equipment for disinfecting surfaces. Victory Innovations is transforming the way businesses, transportation systems, hospitals and schools are cleaning and santizing using electrostatic technology. The chemical-agnostic product enables users to sanitize any surface area with the convenience of cordless portability, faster application time and reduced chemical usage. Founded in 2014, Victory has sales in over 40 countries. For more information, please visit www.victorycomplete.com.

There are alternatives to technological solutions, and some of them will be necessary. Taxation and rationing are effective strategies – but they will be hard to stomach on the scale required. Halving emissions by 2030 means giving up some of the things we love. We could drastically reduce consumption of carbon-intensive products, but without truly decent alternatives, we’re unlikely to. Solar power is 99% cheaper than it was in 1980, but it’s still not cheap. We could cycle more, but our workplaces are not going to move closer to our homes overnight. We already have low-tech alternatives to meat and dairy (they grow in the ground), but the world’s population is growing much faster than veganism. We could use existing technologies to get out of this mess, but it will be far more politically feasible to develop new ones. Description: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index. anxieties regarding possible conflict with China.” —RADM Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), author of China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power “In our current era of artificial intelligence/machine learning,The admirals who developed fleet tactics were busy men with little time to explore the possibilities of untested technology. They used their platforms in the way they knew best. Accepting new technology and integrating it into the naval tool chest were neither natural nor easy processes; doing so was risky and took conscious effort and dedication from advocates and supporters in the highest places. The ruthless pressures of war brought out the true capabilities of technologies. Under wartime conditions, apparently weak technologies such as mines could completely transform the use and even the raison d’être of an alpha technology, the dreadnought battleship. Even an alpha technology must be open to innovative use if it is to remain relevant.